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Abstract. Power plays a key role in any chain relationship. In the past large manufacturers such as Unilever and 
Nestle were the most dominant players in the chain. However, as a result of consolidation among retailers, power has 
shifted  towards  retailers.  Nowadays  such  retailers  as  Wal-Mart,  Carrefour,  and  Tesco  are  seen  as  powerful 
gatekeepers controlling the access to the end consumer. Moreover, branded manufacturers and large multinational 
retailers become increasingly dependent on fewer and larger suppliers who can deliver high quality products at 
competitive prices. Since many decades there is discussion going on about the role of power in chains and marketing 
channels. In order to understand how power and its interactions with other constructs in the chain can be used 
beneficially for management of the whole chain, it is of great importance to investigate the influences and effects of 
power.  Some  of  the  phenomena  which  are  said  to  be  influenced  by  power  include  performance,  satisfaction, 
commitment, relationship quality, conflict, compliance, problem solving, chain integration and collaboration. In this 
context, the aim of our work is to analyze and systemize existing empirical studies, which measure the influences of 
power on other phenomena, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of existing conceptualizations of power, in 
order to add clarity to the existing turmoil in the literature and contribute to the understanding of the role of power in 
chains and marketing channels for managerial purposes. 
Keywords: Power, Power Conceptualization, Supply Chain, Supply Chain Network 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays the top three places in the list in terms of retail sales are taken by Wal-Mart of the US, 
Carrefour of France and Tesco of Britain (Deloitte, 2009). Such retailers are seen as powerful gatekeepers 
controlling the access to the end consumer. In the past, manufacturers controlled distribution and ‘pushed’ 
goods through relatively small retailers. Today, the vast size of the large retailers means they have been 
able to move to a system where they can ‘pull’ goods through from the manufacturers (Ogbonna and 
Wilkinson, 1998). Today some retailers find themselves much bigger in size than their suppliers, and size 
brings power. While retailers derive their power from size and market access, a manufacturer must derive 
its power from advertising and product innovation investments in brand equity (Kumar, 2005). Others 
assume that power of the retailers has increased as a result of store brand entry, which has changed the 
nature of manufacturer-retailer interaction (Hoch and Banerji, 1993, Raju et al., 1995, Hoch 1996). In any 
case, international food retailers and manufacturers have been able to gain a leading position in supply 
chains. Worldwide a group of global players with enormous power has emerged among manufacturers 
and retailers (Lang, 2003). Therefore, power has shifted along the food supply chain towards big branded 
processing  companies  and  retailers  (Bourlakis,  2001),  where  they  are  seen  as  supply  chain  captains, 
which coordinate their suppliers and set the process standards throughout the whole supply chain, and 
main gateway to consumers and gate-keepers between producer and consumer.  
Therefore, the truth is that power does not belong to retailers and processors solely. There are situations in 
which retailers, which are seen as chain captains and administrative centers of supply chain networks are 
also at the mercy of other supply chain members. For example, suppliers seem to have some possible 
avenues of control over category management decision making (Lindblom et al., 2007). The focal actor 
can also be dependent upon the different resources that the suppliers can provide (Medcof, 2001). For 
example, the phenomenon called ‘paradox of power’ makes retailers dependent on a small number of 
large category suppliers, who can deliver safe products of consistently high quality on a large scale at 
competitive prices and who have the potential (and desire) to innovate and add value to commodity-
orientated categories like fresh meat (Fearne and Dedman, 2000). In this way powerful retailers and 3 
branded processing companies may become more reliant and dependent on their suppliers who become 
the providers of brand integrity, which results in a less powerful position for retailers. 
Research has shown that each supply chain member of the network tries to assume a dominant position 
that gives control over other members and the ability to demand more value (Cox, 1997, 2001; Lamming, 
1993;  Caldwell,  2003  and  Watson  et  al.,  2003).  Retailers  and  manufacturers  exist  in  a  competitive 
environment and stores within different channels compete for the same consumers and carry the same 
merchandise (Kotler, 2003). Each party tries to achieve maximum revenues using its power. Suppliers are 
interested to deliver according to their terms and receive good prices for their produce. Manufacturers 
want their products to have an optimal place at the retailers’ shelves and sufficient quantities of products 
in order to avoid stock-outs. Retailers are interested to sell only those products which bring them the 
maximum profits and have acceptable price levels which they pay to their suppliers. Since all supply 
chain members have some power, there is a power play going on within supply chain networks. In order 
to  clarify  the  often  used  word  ‘power’  in  our  discussion,  let  us  look  more  closely  at  the  existing 
definitions, concepts and possible classifications of this phenomenon, with which we deal in our paper. 
Since  many  decades  there  is  discussion  going  on  about  the  role  of  power  in  chains  and  marketing 
channels. In order to understand how power and its interactions with other constructs in the chain can be 
used  beneficially  for  management  of  the  whole  chain,  it  is  of  great  importance  to  investigate  the 
influences and effects of power. Several studies on marketing channels have shown that channel power 
has significant impact on the buyer-supplier relationship and performance in channel distribution (Etgar, 
1978; Gaski and Nevin, 1985; Liu and Wang, 2000; Lee, 2001) and that the power relationship has 
implications for the development of partnerships as the structure of the power-dependence relationship 
determines the level and features of a trading relationship and the performance outcomes (Frazier and 
Antia, 1995; Gattorna and Walters, 1996).  
All of them agree to that fact that power is central to understanding distribution channels and supply 
chains (Alderson, 1957; Heskett et al., 1970, Stern and Beier, 1969), which cannot be ignored by anyone 
interested in understanding how organizations work and end up doing what they do (Mintzberg, 1983) 
and is at the heart of any business-to-business relationship (Cox, 2001). Bowersox and Closs (1996) view 
power as one of the three concepts (along with risk and leadership) necessary for understanding supply 
chain arrangements. Watson et al. (2003) calls power ‘an inherent element of supply relations’ motivating 
it  by  the  existence  of  cooperation  and  competition  in  any  trading  relationship.  So  according  to  the 
literature there is no doubt that power represents a very important issue when studying supply chain 
networks and marketing channels, but what is ‘power’? It seems like there has been much disagreement 
about its exact definition.  
Some  of  the  phenomena  which  we  found  to  be  influenced  by  power  include  firm  profitability 
(Galbraith/Stiles, 1983), dealer satisfaction (Scheer and Stern, 1992), channel conflict (Gaski and Nevin, 
1985; Cather and Howe, 1989; Johnson et al., 1993; Jap and Ganesan, 2000), effects of various sources of 
a channel member’ power among each other (Gaski, 1986), problem solving (McAlister et al., 1986), 
readiness to respond to a request (Keith et al., 1990), incentive for distributors to improve their role 
performance (Iglesias et al., 2000), relational exchange process (Rokkan and Haugland, 2002), alignment 
of contractual safeguarding of buyer-specific and supplier-specific investments (Buvik and Reve, 2002), 
supplier satisfaction (Benton and Maloni, 2005), channel solidarity (Hu and  Sheu, 2005), channel climate 
and solidarity (Hu et al., 2005), compliance (Payan and McFarland, 2005a), satisfaction (Ramaseshan, 
2006),  collaboration  in  virtual  organisations  (Johnston  et  al.,  2006),  in-store  promotions  and  pricing 
(Lindblom et al., 2007), trust and commitment (Leonidou et al., 2007), chain integration (Zhao et al., 
2008), structure of management control (Yan and Gray, 1994).  
Reve and Stern (1979) in their work “Interorganizational Relations in Marketing Channels” made an 
overview  of  empirical  studies  of  power  and  conflict  in  vertical  marketing  systems,  in  which  they 
described the existing studies from 1972 till 1975. However, there has not been any work published since 
then which would summarize the existing empirical studies on power beginning from 1976. This gap in 
the literature and the necessity to take a look at the multitude of empirical studies on power which have 
been written since 1976, have led us to the idea of writing this paper. In this context, the aim of our work 
is to analyze and systemize existing empirical studies, which measure the influences of power on other 
phenomena, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of existing conceptualizations of power, in order to 
add clarity to the existing turmoil in the literature and contribute to the understanding of the role of power 
in chains and marketing channels for managerial purposes. 4 
2. Power 
Difficulty with defining power 
There  are  many  various  definitions  of  power  existing.  We  get  an  impression  that  generations  of 
sociologists, psychologists, political scientists and economists have spent a lot of effort to clarify the 
meaning of the concept of power. Some authors agree that power is an extremely troublesome, elusive, 
notoriously evanescent and subjective concept (Bierstedt, 1950; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Ramsay, 
1996), a vague, poorly defined ‘primitive’ term (Hage, 1972) and a difficult idea to pin down (Clegg et 
al., 2006). In fact, Cartwright (1959) even points out that a lot of authors ‘invent’ their own definitions to 
suit  their  needs. We look in the literature before  we begin to use the  term  ‘power’ in our research. 
However,  it  is  not  our  intention  to  provide  our  own  new  definition  of  power.  Our  aim  is  rather  to 
contribute to the understanding of what this phenomenon is, which is meant by ‘power’.  
Power in philosophy 
The overview of the definitions of power known in philosophy gives us the impression that the question 
of what power really is, has been occupying the minds of philosophers since many hundreds and decades 
of years. One of the first definitions of power is truly the one of Hobbes, who described power as ‘a 
man’s present means, to obtain some future apparent good’ (Hobbes, 1651). The commanding nature of 
power has been underlined by Jouvenel (1945), who points out that the act of commanding and obeying is 
the essence of power itself. The multitude of contradictory names which power has been called is quite 
impressive. For example, Morris (1987) states that power is ’a dispositional concept’, which is ‘neither a 
thing (a resource or vehicle) nor an event (an exercise of power)’, but ‘a capacity’, whereas Foucault 
(1990) suggests to treat power as ‘the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a 
particular society’ indicating that power ‘is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with’. More confusing seems to be the view of Dyrberg (1997), who asserts that 
power represents no identity and that it is simply ‘the limit of the language’. Similar view is represented 
by Holm (2002), who call power ‘nothing but illusion, a theoretical entity that is needed by virtualists in 
order for their model to avoid immediate implosion’. As the literature shows power in philosophy has 
been given a lot of consideration and has been quite often misleadingly defined in abstract terms, which 
are difficult to grasp for our research purpose, except that power is a capacity to obtain some value driven 
by one’s own interest. 
Power in psychology  
However,  apart  from  philosophy  power  has  received  attention  in  psychological  literature.  In  the 
psychological context power is often referred to as ‘ability’ (French and Raven, 1960; Blau, 1964; Kanter, 
1977; Gaski, 1984; Schminke, 1992; Slack, 1997) or ‘capacity’ (Tawney, 1952; Robbins and Barnwell, 
1998) to do something. This ability or capacity is used for modifying the conduct of other individuals 
(Tawney, 1952), mobilizing resources (Kanter, 1977), causing (Gaski, 1984), bringing about outcomes 
(Schminke, 1992) and generally changing something (Simon, 1953; Cartwright and Zander, 1968). This 
characteristic of power ‘to change something’ seems to be put a lot of emphasis on in psychology. The 
concept of making change is observed in structuration theory, according to which power is the means of 
getting things done and, as such, directly implied in human action. The loss of the capacity to make a 
difference is powerlessness. Therefore, power is the capacity of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a 
pre-existing state of affair (Giddens, 1984). The next interesting observation is the relation of power to 
behaviour. In fact, quite a lot of definitions of power in psychology contain the term ‘behaviour’ (Simon, 
1953; Simon, 1957; Mechanic, 1962; Mullins, 2007) or the term ‘conduct’ (Tawney, 1952). One of the 
theories which put the concept of behaviour in its focus is field theory, according to which behaviour 
results from tensions between an individual’s self-perceptions and the environment. Power of person A 
over person B is determined in terms of the force A could bring to bear on B and the resistance B could 
offer. Mathematically the power of A over B is defined as ‘the quotient of the maximum force that A 
could (or possibly could) induce on B and the maximum resistance that B could offer’ Lewin (1951). In 
general, the psychological view of power is very much based on relationships and behaviour among 
individuals, according to which power is an ability or capacity to change or modify behaviour of other 
individuals in a dyadic interpersonal relationship in order to achieve desired outcomes through a set of 
rewards or punishments. 5 
Power in sociology  
In sociology the concept of power has been basically introduced by Weber (1947) who defines power as 
‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out one’s own will 
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on  which this  probability rests’.  One has to say that  most 
concepts of power are founded on this one of Weber’s (Buckley, 1967; Bredemeier and Stephenson 
1962).  
A starting point for our discussion of power from the sociological perspective could be event-structure 
theory, which uses the conception suggested by Dahl (1957), who defines power of A over a in terms of 
‘the probability that a will do x in response to A’s request minus the probability that a would do x in the 
absence of A’s request’. Dahl’s definition can be understood as referring to that special subset of causal 
relations he chooses to call power. In the event-structure theory the concept of power is broadened to 
include not only what A makes a to do, but also what he prevents a from doing. 
In social exchange theory relations are viewed as power relations and the outcome of any particular 
exchange depends upon the relative power of the participants. Power is viewed as the mechanics that can 
explain these relations among participating actors. Homans (1974) state that ‘A’s power over B is the 
extent to which A can affect B’s behaviour (through exchange)’. 
According to rational choice theory, in which all actions are assumed to be fundamentally rational in 
character and actors calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do, the 
notion of power is a generalization of the wealth concept in economic theory (Fararo, 2001).  
Network  exchange  theory  has  its  peculiarity  in  the  fact  that  it  puts  power  in  relation  to  nodes  and 
positions in the network which allow achieving favorable outcomes. Cook et al. (1983) define power in 
any dyadic exchange as relation AB (where A and B are actors, and x and y are resources introduced in 
exchange), the power of A over B is the potential of A to obtain favorable outcomes at B’s expense. 
Power-dependence theory views social relations in terms of mutual dependence between the parties and 
locates power at the interdependencies among actors embedded in those social relations.  Emerson (1962) 
states that the power of A over B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be overcome by A, 
therefore, the power of A over B is equal to and based upon the dependence of B on A. 
Resource dependency theory specifies the basis of the created dependencies among the actors in form 
critical resources. Therefore, power is based on the control of resources that are considered strategic 
within the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and is often expressed in terms  of budgets and 
resource allocations (Pfeffer and Moore, 1980; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). According to resource-
dependency  theory power is  conceptualized as the amount of resources controlled by  actors. Power-
dependence and resource-dependency theories offer a view that power is proportional to the degree of 
dependence among actors acquired either through control of scares resource or something else. 
The sociological view of power is widely represented by a group of exchange theories, in which social 
interactions are seen as exchanges among the multiple actors. Quite a number of theories underline the 
close  connection  of  power  to  wealth  and  ownership  of  valuable  objects  or  resources.  A  number  of 
sociological  theories  have  equally  defined  power  as  a  specific  type  of  relation  not  only  between 
individuals  as  in  psychology  but  also  within  a  group  of  persons  or  among  groups.  Therefore,  from 
sociological perspective power is an ability to intentionally make someone do something in order to fulfill 
one’s  own  will  or  goal  against  existing  resistance  from  the  side  of  the  weaker  party  in  a  dyadic 
relationship or within a group. 
Power in politics  
Political scientists have also made their contribution to the development of the body of literature on 
power. One of the most often referred definitions is the one of the political scientist Dahl (1986). He 
defines power as ‘the ability of one individual or group to get another unit to do something that it would 
not otherwise have done’. This perspective is also shared by other researchers (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1977; Stanfield and Carroll, 2004). Others define power in terms of ‘the participation in the making of 
decisions’ (Lasswell and Kaplan (1950). In fact power is referred to as the ability to change or influence 
‘decisions’ also by other political scientists (Easton, 1953; Bernhagen, 2003) as well as ‘actions’ of other 
individuals  (Easton,  1953;  Easton,  1958)  and  ‘freedom  of  actions’  (Oppenheim,  1961;  Mokken  and 
Stokman, 1976). Some of the authors (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950) are even more specific to the subject of 6 
how such outcomes can be achieved. For example, Sharp (1980) refers to power as “the totality of means, 
influences, and pressures - including authority, rewards, and sanctions - available for use to achieve the 
objectives of the power-holder”. From this perspective power appears to be formidable and even negative. 
However, political power is also seen from the positive and constructive side. Wilson (1913) states that 
power ‘consists in one’s capacity to link his will with the purpose of others, to lead by reason and a gift of 
cooperation’. Others address power in terms of ‘the opportunity to build, to create, to nudge history in a 
different direction’ (Nixon in Pfeiffer, 1992) or ‘capacity to restructure actual situations’ (MacMillan, 
1978). 
Power in economics, management and marketing 
Applied to the economic context power is defined quite similarly, namely as ‘ability’ (Emerson, 1962; El-
Ansary  and  Stern,  1972;  Wilkinson,  1973;  Schmid,  1978;  Bartlett,  1989;    Schmid,  2004),  ‘capacity’ 
(Mintzberg,  1983)  or  ‘capability’  (Ratnasingham,  2000)  to  ‘to  influence  the  intentions  and  actions’ 
(Emerson,  1962),  ‘decisions’  (El-Ansary  and  Stern,  1972;  Wilkinson,  1973)  and/or  ‘behaviour’ 
(Wilkinson, 1973) or ‘implement one’s interests’ (Schmid, 1978) in the economic environment. Emerson 
(1962) defines it as “the ability of one firm to influence the intentions and actions of another firm” and 
Ratnasingham (2000) refers to it as “the capability of a firm to exert influence on another firm to act in a 
prescribed manner”.  
A point of departure in the discussion of power from the economic and managerial point of view could be 
the transaction cost theory which rests on the basic premise that firms try to internalize those activities 
that they are able to perform at lower costs. According to Williamson (1975) each partner is motivated by 
the self-interest of retaining an advantage for themselves and that a situation of power must be the ideal 
position to be in. As a result, the firm with most power seeks to minimize his transaction costs, and the 
less influential channel member is forced to bear the burden of increased transaction costs involved in an 
exchange process by incurring more transaction specific investments.  
From the point of view of agency theory which is concerned with resolving two problems in agency 
relationships: the conflict of the desires or goals of the principal and agent and the problem of risk sharing 
that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
principal’s key problem is that the agent always retains control over his actions, and may work to his own 
advantage. In this case the principal always tries to act in such a way as to align agent’s interests with 
those of his own and, therefore, to retain power over the actions of the agent. 
Another  approach  to  power  is  provided  by  the  game  theory.  For  example,  the  prisoner’s  dilemma 
constitutes one of the problems in game theory. No matter what the other player does, one player will 
always gain a greater payoff by playing defect. The amount of payoffs determines the power of the 
player. The game theoretic concept that is closest to the notion of power is bargaining power (Osborne 
and Rubinstein, 1990), which is determined by the extent to which players can influence the division of 
contested resources. 
The theory of competitive strategy views power in terms of supplier and buyer power driven by the 
number of major customers of a supplier’s component, a supplier’s market share of a given component, 
the number of suppliers from which a buyer purchases a particular component, the number of potential 
suppliers for a given component, and the amount of revenue a supplier generates from a single buyer, the 
uniqueness of the product or service, as well as the cost of switching from one product to another (Porter, 
1980).  
There are also other perspectives on power formed by marketing, chain and network science, supply 
chains and marketing channels literature. Most definitions of power in studies on marketing channels are 
based on that one of El-Ansary and Stern (1972) who define power as ‘the ability of a channel member to 
control  the  decision  variables  in  the  marketing  strategy  of  another  member  in  a  given  channel  at  a 
different level of distribution’. Cox (2003) defines power in supply chains as ‘the ability of a firm (or an 
entrepreneur) to own and control critical assets in markets and supply chains that allow it to sustain its 
ability to appropriate and accumulate value for itself by constantly leveraging its customers, competitors 
and suppliers’. Hu and Sheu (2003) view power in terms of strategy-influencing source that is oriented 
from one channel member to another. Other authors use more o less similar definitions of power and 
derive them from already mentioned ones. 7 
In  general  economics  does  not  deal  with  the  definition  of  the  construct  of  power  itself,  but  rather 
overtakes it from socio-economic strands of sciences and applies it into the economic settings. Economic 
view reflects the assumption that firms act according to the principle of partially rational and partially 
bounded rational behaviour and assumes that actors are motivated by the possibility of making a profit. 
Power  in  economics  is  associated  with  payoffs,  possession  of  valuables,  minimizing  costs  and 
maximizing gains and with the aim to gain as much profit as possible even if this requires aggressive acts 
and coercion. 
Summarizing statement 
The conclusion can be made, that power is always used to influence the decisions, actions and behaviour 
of the others for own profit and represents optimal and efficient behaviour of the power holder. The 
examination of all of these definitions of power from different perspectives allows us to conclude that 
power generally refers to the ability, capacity or potential to get others do something, to command, to 
influence, to determine or to control the behaviours, intentions, decisions or actions of others in the 
pursuit of one’s own goals or interests against the will of the power target, as well as to induce changes, 
to mobilize resources, to restructure situations, etc. All these definitions of power seem to use similar 
terms and have a common sense and reflect both the commanding as well as constructive nature of power. 
3. Conceptualization of power in empirical studies 
As stated by many authors there is no single conceptualization of power (Dahl 1957; Bacharach and Lawler 
1980). Dahl (1957) pointed out it quite well in saying “…all we have or can have is a great variety of 
operational concepts no one of which is strictly comparable with another” and suggested labeling them: 
power 1, power 2, etc. In the previous chapter we have given an overview of existing definitions and 
theoretical views of power found in philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science and economics, 
management and marketing. This has been the first step in clarifying the construct of power.  
In this chapter we present the multitude of power conceptualizations found in the body of empirical studies 
dealing with studying the effects of power on other phenomena. As Table 1 shows, the conceptualizations 
of power found in the reviewed empirical studies include: dependence; power sources (reward, coercion, 
expert,  referent,  legitimate  power,  coercive  vs.  noncoercive,  mediated  vs.  nonmediated,  opportunistic 
power,  informational  power);  influence  strategies  (request,  recommendation,  legalistic  plea,  promise, 
threat); influence (attributed, manifest, achieved); potential (unexercised) vs. exercised power; structural 
vs. bargaining power; context-based vs. resource-based bargaining power; control over the economic 
issues vs. control over marketing issues; market-based approach (number of buyers and sellers on the 
market as well as number of transactions the buyer and seller were allowed to complete); dual notion of 
essentiality and exclusivity. Our aim is to look at the previous approaches to conceptualizing power and to 
acquire an insight into how we can conceptualize it for using it the context of agri-food supply chains and 
networks. 
Dependence 
Quite a few researchers have used in their study the concept of dependence in order to conceptualize 
power (Kale, 1986; Kim et al., 2004; Bunduchi, 2007). In the study of Kale (1986) dependence is defined 
as the degree to which the target fm needs to maintain its relationship with the source in order to achieve 
its desired goals. He assumes that this approach is especially appropriate for studying channel systems 
because the relatively clear-cut goals of each channel member can be easily identified. The view of the 
concept of power in terms of dependence has also been underscored in the study of Kim et al. (2004).  
The authors state that power fundamentally resides in the dependence of one actor on another. Although 
both  actors  are  mutually  dependent  in  an  exchange,  it  does  not  mean  that  they  are  always  equally 
dependent on each other. The less dependent actor will maintain a power advantage, resulting in a power 
imbalance. In essence, asymmetric dependence between two actors in an exchange relation constitutes the 
essence of the concept of power dependence. Bunduchi (2007) also views power in terms of dependence 
and access to critical resources. According to her study an agent has power only if others are dependent 
on the resources that the agent commands and access to these resources represents the primary stimulus 
for organisations to engage in interactions. 
Power sources 8 
There are a number of studies (Gaski, 1986; Yeung et al., 2009; Rawwa et al., 1997; Lindblom et al., 
2007; Keith et al., 1990), which are based on the taxonomy of French and Raven (1959). French and 
Raven (1959) identified five types of power, each based on its source or origin: coercive, reward, expert, 
legitimate, and referent power. Coercive power enables an individual to punish others. Reward power 
depends on the ability of the power holder to offer rewards to others. Expert power is derived from the 
skills  or  special  knowledge  in  a  specific  subject.  Legitimate  power  stems  from  a  legitimate  right  to 
influence and an obligation to accept this influence. Referent power depends on an ability to be attractive 
to others and depends on the charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder.  
Klein Woolthuis et al. (2002) use a notion close to the meaning of coercive power. They call it “formal 
control” which is used as safeguards against the hazard of opportunism. Since one has no reliable ex ante 
knowledge of whether, and when, opportunism will occur, one should employ safeguards against the 
hazard of opportunism. The safeguards are primarily based on exercising coercive power or ‘deterrence’ 
(Shapiro  et.  al.,  1992,  Maguire  et.  al.,  2001):  hierarchical  supervision,  contract  enforcement  and 
monitoring, threat of ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1970), damage of reputation, and impairment of hostages. These 
safeguards constitute what we call ‘formal control’. They function as power mechanisms (Blau, 1964). 
In order to capture the different facets of power even better, some more sources have been added to the 
seminal  taxonomy  of  French  and  Raven  (1959).  In  their  study  Rawwa  et  al.  (1997)  draws  on 
argumentation of Tedeschi and Bonoma (1972) who have shown that one source of power is based on the 
A’s ability to control critical aspects of B’s environment so as to affect B’s strategies in the desired 
direction, which they called opportunistic power source. Its use has been defined as seeking “self-interest 
with guile” (Williamson, 1975) and concerns possession and dissemination of valuable information and is 
based on deceit and opportunism of the power holder. 
Some authors have used dichotomies of power such as coercive vs. non-coercive (Cather and Howe, 
1989; Hu and Sheu, 2005; Hu et al., 2005; Payan and McFarland, 2005a), which was suggested by Hunt 
and Nevin (1974). While coercive sources of power arise from punishment, non-coercive sources arise 
from rewards or high quality assistances. 
A number of studies (Johnson et al., 1993; Brown et al., 1995; Zhao et al., 2008; Maloni and Benton, 
2000)  apply  the  taxonomy  of  power  sources  developed  by  Johnson  et  al.,  (1985),  who  grouped  the 
original  power  sources  into  mediated  (reward,  coercion,  legal  legitimate)  and  nonmediated  (referent, 
expert, traditional legitimate, and information) power sources.  With some limited variation Benton and 
Maloni (2005) apply coercive-mediated (coercive and legal legitimate) vs. reward-mediated taxonomy of 
power sources. 
Influence strategies 
Another  big  group  of  studies  apply  the  concept  of  influence  strategies.  Kale  (1986)  is  using  the 
classification  of  influence  strategies  (threat,  promise,  legalistic  plea,  recommendation,  request, 
information exchange). Recommendation  means  that influencing party stresses that  specific action is 
needed to achieve desired outcomes. Information exchange is expressed when influencing party supplies 
information with no specific action requested or otherwise indicated. Promise is observed in case when 
influencing party certifies to extend specified reward contingent on the less powerful party’s compliance. 
Request  means  that  influencing  party  asks  the  less  powerful  party  to  act;  no  mention  of  subsequent 
sanctions.  Legalistic  plea  is  made  when  influencing  party  contends  that  the  less  powerful  party’s 
compliance  is  required  by  formal  agreement.  Threat  means  that  influencing  party  informs  the  less 
powerful party that failure to comply will result in negative sanctions. Frazier and Rody (1991) have 
identified four noncoercive strategies (information exchange, discussion of business strategy, requests, 
and recommendations) and three coercive strategies (promises, threats, and legalistic pleas) of relevance 
to suppliers and distributors alike. Venkatesh et al. (1995) also differentiate among noncoercive, soft 
coercive and hard coercive strategies within the influence strategies. 
Influence (attributed, manifest and achieved) 
Another group of studies use the concept of “influence”. For example, Kale (1986) has used the term 
“attributed influence” as a concept of power. In his paper attributed influence refers to the degree of 
control a dealer perceives a manufacturer to exert on the dealership. Mohr et al. (1996) use the notion of 
“achieved influence”. Although power is commonly expressed as the ability of one party to influence 
another (Gaski 1984), control is best viewed as an outcome of power and results when a firm is successful 
in modifying its partner’s behaviours (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1984; El-Ansary and Stem 1972; Etgar 9 
1976;  Skinner  and  Guiltinan  1985).  This  difference  is  consistent  with  Frazier’s  (1983b)  distinction 
between the ability to influence, or power, and “achieved influence”, or control. In their model, they 
address the effects of manufacturer control over the dealer. Manufacturer control implies that the dealer 
has  yielded  to  the  manufacturer's  wishes,  possibly  acceding  to  demands,  acquiescing  to  requests,  or 
relinquishing  decision-making  autonomy.  In  other  words,  dealers  that  do  business  with  high-control 
manufacturers yield decision-making authority to the manufacturer. Kohli (1989) uses in his study the 
conceptualization of power in the form of “manifest influence”, which refers to changes in purchase 
decision-related  opinions  and  behaviour  of  buying  center  members  that  result  from  the  individual's 
participation in a buying center (Kohli and Zaltman, 1988). 
Potential (unexercised) vs. exercised power 
Several authors have recognized the distinction between actual or exercised and potential or unexercised 
power. In fact, as we have observed from the previous chapter, power is usually defined as a capacity to 
control or influence others. But the capacity to perform acts of control and their actual performance are 
clearly not the same thing. The distinction between “possessing or having power” and “exercising power” 
seems to make big difference for several authors. For example, Hart and Saunders (1997) point out the 
fact that power can be potential and exercised. They state that potential power relationships exist even 
though no immediate outcome is evident, or no obvious power attempt has been made (Provan et al., 
1980). Potential power could be a source of influence even when it is not exercised. For example, the 
more dependent firm in a dyad may comply with something it believes that the more powerful firm wants, 
even though the more powerful firm may never make the request. By contrast, exercised power is most 
likely to be a factor of influence where a less powerful firm has not yet adopted ED1 with any of its 
trading  partners.  Power  is  exercised  by  the  use  of  certain  mechanisms  which  have  important 
consequences for the way that EDI is used. These mechanisms range on a continuum from persuasive to 
coercive. 
Structural vs. bargaining power 
Drawing on empirical findings from industrial buyer–seller relationships, Buvik and Reve (2002) use the 
classification of power according to “ability to safeguard specific assets by exercising control over the 
supplier” - structural power (e.g. buyer concentration)” and “ability to influence the terms and conditions 
of contracts - bargaining power. As pointed out by Heide and John (1988), there is a connection between 
resource-based  dependence  and  asset  specificity,  in  that  asset  specificity  reinforces  the  replacement 
problem of resource-based dependence, which in turn concerns the tension between the motivation and 
the ability to structure exchange relationships in the desired way. In the resource-dependence perspective, 
structural power is expected to affect the transacting parties’ ability to align their desired governance 
arrangements (Heide and John, 1992). This situation might reduce the buying firm’s ability to achieve the 
safeguarding it desires if the supplier possesses strong bargaining power (Heide and John, 1988). 
Yan and Gray (1994) refer to power as to the notion of bargaining power indicating a bargainer’s ability 
to favorably change the bargaining set, to win accommodations from the other party, and to influence the 
outcome of a negotiation. They differentiate between context-based and resource-based bargaining power. 
Context-based can be derived from having alternatives, such as other potential partners with whom to 
negotiate or other channels through which to accomplish the same mission the joint venture is to achieve. 
The components of resource-based bargaining power signify the resources and capabilities committed by 
the partners to a joint venture. These resource contributions are either explicitly specified in the joint 
venture  agreements  (contracts,  memorandums,  and  licenses)  or  verbally  recognized  by  both  partners 
during negotiations. 
Context-based vs. resource-based bargaining power 
Iglesias et al. (2000) classify power in terms of control over issues in bargaining processes in marketing 
channels. Control over the economic issues of the exchange (for example, manufacturer price, or deferred 
payments in manufacturer-distributor relationships). These issues directly affect the profitability of the 
buyer and the seller; thus, both firms will always be interested in maximizing their control. A maximum 
control over these issues does not necessarily mean a maximum pressure on the partner (which could be 
pernicious in the long term), but does imply maintaining prices and deferred payments in a convenient 
interval for the firm. Nevertheless, the distribution of the channel incomes among members will strongly 
depend on the distribution of the control over these issues. Control over marketing issues (for example, 
distributor assortment, merchandising, design of promotions, distributor price, distributor services). These 10 
issues affect the image of the manufacturer’s products and so, the performance of the entire channel. The 
manufacturer is frequently interested in controlling these issues to achieve a correct development of his 
marketing strategy; but the distributor is often also interested because they could affect his costs and his 
own image and marketing strategy. 
Market-based approach  
McAlister et al. (1986) uses the market-based approach to conceptualizing power, which includes number 
of buyers and sellers on the market as well as number of transactions the buyer and seller were allowed to 
complete. For two of  the  markets there  were equal  numbers of buyers and sellers. In the other  two 
markets there were two sellers for every buyer-a power imbalance in favour of the buyers. Orthogonal to 
this power manipulation, power was manipulated by the number of transactions each channel member 
could  complete.  In  two  of  the  markets,  buyers  and  sellers  were  limited  to  completing  at  most  nine 
transactions. In the other two markets, buyers were limited to 12 transactions and sellers were limited to 
six transactions-a power imbalance in favour of the seller as there was more demand for the goods than 
the supply could fulfil. 
Dual notion of essentiality and exclusivity 
Galbraith/Stiles (1983) use the concept of essentiality and exclusivity to grasp the idea of power in their 
study. They state that firm A has power over Firm B to the extent that Firm A can get Firm B to do 
something it would not otherwise do. The basis for such power is grounded in: (1) the essentiality (or 
importance) of the function a firm performs in the production chain, either by product or service, and (2) 
the exclusivity by which the firm performs that function. The dual notion of essentiality and exclusivity 
keys the power relationships within the chain of production and distribution. 
After looking into the empirical studies, we have discovered that researchers have been confronted with the 
task to conceptualize the idea of power in a specific empirical setting in order to study its effects on other 
phenomena  mentioned  earlier.  They  include:  include:  dependence;  power  sources  (reward,  coercion, 
expert,  referent,  legitimate  power,  coercive  vs.  noncoercive,  mediated  vs.  nonmediated,  opportunistic 
power,  informational  power);  influence  strategies  (request,  recommendation,  legalistic  plea,  promise, 
threat); influence (attributed, manifest, achieved); potential (unexercised) vs. exercised power; structural 
vs. bargaining power; context-based vs. resource-based bargaining power; control over the economic 
issues vs. control over marketing issues; market-based approach (number of buyers and sellers on the 
market as well as number of transactions the buyer and seller were allowed to complete); dual notion of 
essentiality and exclusivity. Following advice of Bacharach and Lawler (1980), who state that ‘when 
doing research in order to capture the term of power we must identify a more concrete phenomenon or 
idea  to  which  the  primitive  term  points’,  we  analyze  the  main  approaches  to  conceptualizing  power 
according  to  suitability  criteria  (setting/context  of  application,  managerial  implication,  unit/level  of 
analysis) with an aim of coming to the most suitable for using it the context of agri-food supply chains 
and networks.  
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this chapter we build our discussion around the three in our opinion most important and also widely 
applied conceptualizations (dependence, power sources, influence strategies). The concept of power as 
dependence is found in many different settings including from broker- principal relations (Keith et al., 
1990), distribution channel in the tungsten carbide tool industry in India (Kale, 1986), Keiretsu member 
firms  (Kim  et  al.,  2004)  as  well  as  the  nature  of  inter-organisational  relationships  of  Internet  based 
electronic markets (Bunduchi, 2007). The concept of power sources is used, for example, in channel 
relationship and both supplier and retailer (Brown et al., 1995), in channels of distribution of independent 
U.S. pharmacists (Rawwa et al., 1997), distribution channel relationships of U.S. automotive Industry 
(Maloni and Benton, 2000). Influence strategies are used, for example, in the study of supply retail firm 
which began using EDI (Hart and Saunders, 1997), in the setting of  distribution firms of specialty tools 
and fasteners in the US (Payan and McFarland, 2005a), suppliers and the purchase committee members 
National Association of Purchasing Management (Venkatesh et al., 1995).  
Beier and Stern (1969) suggest that the approach of conceptualizing power as dependence is especially 
appropriate for studying channel systems because the relatively clear-cut goals of each channel member 
can be easily identified. However, Cook et al. (1983) point out the difficulty with power-dependence 11 
concepts is that they are too closely bound to dyadic analysis. In examining the distribution of power in a 
supply chain network, one has to take into account not only dyadic relationships but also the network 
level.  
According to our reviewed literature we can say that no study was found which examines the effects of 
power on other phenomena on a network level. This fact makes us raise the question whether it is possible 
at all to study power otherwise than dyadically. It seems like the nature of the power relationship dictates 
that there is always a power holder and a power target, or, expressed differently, a more powerful and a 
less powerful actor. In fact, according to Blau (1964) relationships characterized by co-equal influence do 
not  even  qualify  as  power  relationships.  So  the  nature  of  power  relationships  presupposes  an 
asymmetrical distribution of power among the actors, assumingly two of them if we speak about the 
dyadic level. But in our case we intend to study the effects of power in cooperation and coordination 
issues within a supply chain network. Whether there is any chance to study power in a triad or within a 
bigger network remains unanswered.  
However, what we observe is that the concept of dependence is also found in combination with power 
sources or influence strategies. Payan and McFarland (2005a) argue that channel studies typically include 
dependence as a precursor to the use of influence strategies. However, these studies do not elucidate how 
dependence  and  the  use  of  influence  strategies  operate  together  to  achieve  compliance.  Kelman  and 
Hamilton (1989) provide some theoretical direction. They define dependence as the extent to which the 
target perceives the source as instrumental to the achievement of its goals, and they suggest that the target 
is dependent on the source to the extent that the target perceives that the source can facilitate or impede 
the target’s goals. 
It is also not clear whether and if yes than how the concept of dependence can be combined with power 
sources. There seems to be similarity in the way some researchers define influence strategies and power 
sources or bases.  But taking into account the opinion of Dahl (1957), who stated that influence strategies 
represent the “means” or “instruments” A uses to exert power over B against the discussion of power 
sources (bases) by French and Raven (1959) upon which power may be derived, it seems logical that 
influence strategies may be applied as mechanisms to exert power derived from the bases of power. For 
example, a power holder may derive his power from coercive power source and use it to exert his power 
in the form of threats, punishments or other actions, which would represent influence strategies. In that 
way the logical connection between sources and strategies of power application seems to be existing.  
So power sources (information, rewards, punishments, etc.) are just sources or bases and represent some 
kind of resources available to firms in applying them for the purpose of exerting power or building other 
constructs such as trust, commitment, etc. For example, we find similar bases for trust (calculus-based, 
experience-based, cognition-based, goodwill, and affect-based trust). So it is possible to identify five 
common origins of power and trust: fear of punishment or trouble; repeated rewards or positive actions; 
knowledge,  information  or  competence;  established  or  accepted  norms  or  laws;  affection,  reputation, 
image or identification with the other. The same parallel can be drawn assumingly with other constructs 
such as commitment, satisfaction, etc. which also may be derived from similar sources or bases. 
Probably,  most  of  the  mentioned  conceptualizations  are  not  able  to  capture  simultaneously  all  the 
dimensions  of  power  discussed  above  despite  their  interconnected  and  often  overlapping  nature. 
However, it is necessary to at least define whether it makes sense to analyze different power typologies 
within a particular relationship. Since power is a multidimensional concept, it seems necessary to apply 
conceptualizations of power  that account  for different power dimensions. We argue that in terms of 
supply chain networks such conceptualizations of power could include at least the aspects of dependence, 
sources of power and influence strategies as instruments of exerting power derived from different sources.  
These  conceptualizations  in  combination  seem  to  reflect  our  purpose  –  namely  finding  the  right 
conceptualization  for  grasping  the  idea  of  power  in  agri-food  supply  chain  networks  as  effective 
mechanism for achieving cooperation and coordination among supply chain network actors. In order to 
manage supply chain networks successfully the knowledge of different power sources is essential. In 
particular, managers should be aware of the fact that power may have different effects on coordination 
and cooperation depending on its source. When solving coordination and cooperation problems, managers 
need  to  assess  the  costliness  of  the  chosen  power  based  on  the  available  source.  For  managerial 
implication this means that knowing the sources and application strategies of power one can help to work 
out strategies how to design their management practices to successfully manage supply chain networks. 12 
Concluding,  we have to state that the construct of power still has to be advanced in order to better 
understand the role of power and determine the pattern of its distribution in supply chain networks. 
Strategic by their nature, such networks are characterized by the presence of the overall network’s goals 
that are most often set by the focal company. Additionally, there are goals of the single actors constituting 
the network. On account of this, Frazier (1983a) states that the higher the level of ideological agreement 
on goals, the less need will exist for the use of power. 
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Appendix 1. Power Classification Criteria and Level of Analysis Addressed in Empirical Studies on Power  
Study  Coercive  Reward  Legitimate  Referent  Expert  Coercive/ 
Noncoercive  Other criteria 
Level of analysis 
Dyadic  Network 
Galbraith/Stiles (1983)                X   
Gaski/Nevin (1985)  X  X  X  X  X      X   
Gaski (1986)  X  X  X  X  X      X   
McAlister et al (1986)                X   
Kale (1986)             
Influence strategies (request, 
recommendation, legalistic plea, 
promise, threat) and attributed 
influence 
X   
Kohli (1989)  X  X  X  X  X    Manifest influence, informational 
power, departmental power  X   
Keith et al. (1990)  X  X  X  X  X    Informational power  X   
Frazier/Rody (1991)            X 
Influence strategies (request, 
recommendation, promise, threat, and 
legalistic plea) 
X   
Scheer/Stern (1992)  X  X         
Noncontingent reward, positively and 
negatively framed contingent reward, 
and contingent penalty. 
X   





   





X   
Brown et al. (1995)  X  X  X  X  X   
Mediated/ 
Nonmediated power (legitimate power 
as legal and traditional legitimate) 
X   
Venkatesh et al (1995)  X  X  X  X  X   
Influence strategies (requests, 
information exchange, 
recommendations, promises, threats, 
legalistic pleas), information power, 
manifest influence 
X   
Mohr et al. (1996)              Manufacturer control  X   19 
Study  Coercive  Reward  Legitimate  Referent  Expert  Coercive/ 
Noncoercive  Other criteria 
Level of analysis 
Dyadic  Network 
Rawwa et al. (1997)  X  X  X  X  X    Opportunistic power  X   
Hart/Saunders (1997)  X            Potential/ 
Exercised power, Persuasive power  X   
Maloni/Benton (2000)              Mediated/ 
Nonmediated power  X   
Jap/Ganesan (2000)                X   
Iglesias et al. (2000)              Control over the economic issues and 
control over marketing issues  X   
Dawes/Massey (2001)             
Influence strategies (threats and 
legalistic pleas), departmental power, 
manifest influence 
X   
Rokkan/Haugland (2002)                X   
Buvik/Reve (2002)                   
Chan/Lee (2002)              Power of suppliers and power of IT  X   
Klein Woolthuis et al. 
(2002)              Formal control  X   
Kim et al. (2004)                X   
Chatziaslan et al. (2005)                X   
Benton/Maloni (2005)                   
Hu/Sheu (2005)  X  X  X  X  X      X   
Hu et al. (2005)            X    X   
Payan/McFarland (2005a)            X    X   
Ramaseshan (2006)  X  X  X  X  X      X   
Johnston et al. (2006)                X   
Lindblom et al. (2007)  X  X  X  X  X      X   
Leonidou et al. (2007)            X    X   
Bunduchi (2007)                X   
Zhao et al. (2008)  X  X  X  X  X    Mediated/ 
Nonmediated power  X   
Yeung et al. (2009)  X              X   
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Appendix 2. Empirical Studies on Power Influences in Supply Chains and Marketing Channels 
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production and 
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Power as a single construct  The results of the estimated model 
support the hypothesis that power 
conditions between adjacent stages in the 






Study on the 





Field study        Distribution 























dichotomization of power 
The results support the proposition that 
exercise of the coercive power source by 
a supplier has a stronger effect on dealer 
satisfaction and channel conflict than the 
mere presence of that power source. In 
contrast, exercise of the reward power 
source seems to have only a marginal 
impact on these dependent variables. 
Gaski 
(1986) 
Study on effects of 
various sources 
of a channel 
member's power 
among each other 

























Reward, coercion, expert, 
referent, and legitimate power 
sources 
 
The research findings introduce a new 
complexity to the consideration and 
investigation of power related 
phenomena in distribution channels. The 
use of reward and coercion may have a 
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Power as a single construct 
determined by manipulating the 
number of buyers and sellers in 
each of the four markets, as well 
as the maximum number of 
transactions the buyer and seller 
were allowed to complete. 
 
An unbalanced power condition leads the 
channel members to divert their attention 
from problem solving to identifying the 
extent to which they can benefit (avoid 
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Operationalization of power  Results and implications 
Kale 
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and dealer  
Power conceptualized through 
dependence, influence strategies 
(request, recommendation, 
legalistic plea, promise, threat) 
and attributed influence (degree 
of control a dealer perceives a 
manufacturer to exert on the 
dealership). 
 
The study findings generally suggest that 
the more powerful manufacturers in a 
sellers' market are perceived to rely on 
threats, promises, and legalistic pleas to 
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dichotomization of power 
Results indicate that the use of coercive 
strategies was associated with increased 
channel conflict for both independent 
and exclusive agency insurers. The use 
of noncoercive strategies was associated 
with decreased channel conflict for 
independent agency insurers. 
Kohli 
(1989) 
Study of factors 
that affect an 
individual’s 
influence in a 
buying center. 





















(changes in purchase decision 
related opinions and behaviour), 
informational power, 
departmental power (the status 
of a source's department) 
The study reported assesses the relative 
importance of several influence 
determinants by simultaneously 
examining a more comprehensive set of 
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dependence on a 
principal on the 
principal’s use of 
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The first factor was type of 
power base with five levels-
reward, coercive, expert, 
information, and referent. The 
second factor was the 
dependence of the broker on the 
principal and had two levels-
high and low. 
Results suggest that a broker's 
dependence on a principal has a strong 
effect on the broker's readiness to 
respond to a request made by the 
principal. The greater the broker’s 
dependence, the more likely the broker 
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Influence strategies (request, 
recommendation, promise, 
threat, and legalistic plea) 
 
The noncoercive and coercive 
categorization of influence strategies 
adopted in the study appears somewhat 
simplistic and crude, partly because of 
our inability to make use of the 
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contingent reward (positively 
framed), negatively framed 
contingent reward, and 
contingent penalty. 
 
Identical power resources had different 
effects on the target’s satisfaction and 
trust when they were exercised 
negatively rather than positively and 




Study of the 
influence of 
perceptions on 
control and conflict 
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dichotomization of power 
 
This study has demonstrated empirically, 
that the social psychological factors of 
trade relationships must adapt when the 
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structure of 
management 





















the U.S. and 
China 
Power conceptualized as 
context-based bargaining power 
(stakes and availability of 
alternatives) and resource-based 
bargaining power (the resources 
and capabilities committed by 
the partners to a joint venture). 
The findings of this comparative case 
study provide confirmative evidence that 
the relative levels of joint venture 
partners' bargaining power has a 
significant impact on the pattern of 
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Operationalization of power  Results and implications 
Brown et 
al. (1995) 
Study on the 
impact of the 
supplier’s use of 
power on 
the retailer’s 
commitment to the 
channel 
relationship and 
both supplier and 
retailer 
performance 




















Power is conceptualized a 
mediated (i.e., reward, coercion, 
legal legitimate) and 
nonmediated (i.e., expertise, 
referent, information, traditional 
legitimate) 
 
The findings of this study provide partial 
support for the notion that the 
effectiveness of power usage is 
moderated by the balance of power. 
When the retailer is more powerful, the 
supplier’s use of mediated power erodes 
the retailer’s commitment to the channel 
relationship to a greater degree than 
when either the supplier is more 
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pervasiveness of 
the six influence 
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Power conceptualized as five 
power bases corresponding to 
influence strategies (requests, 
information exchange, 
recommendations, promises, 
threats, legalistic pleas) and 
manifest influence 
Findings suggest that noncoercive 
strategies (i.e., information exchange and 
requests) and recommendations (a soft 
coercive strategy) are the most frequently 
used strategies, whereas threats and 
promises (high on instrumentality) are 
used the least. 
Mohr et 
al. (1996) 
Study on the 
effects of the 
interrelationships 






















Power conceptualized as 
manufacturer control (dealer's 
perceptions regarding the degree 
to which the manufacturer 
controlled or influenced the 
dealer's decisions and 
operations). 
 
The findings for manufacturer control 
indicate significant interactions between 
control and collaborative communication 
for all three outcomes. More 
collaborative communication has a 
stronger, positive effect on outcomes 
under low-control situations, and a 
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Rawwa et 
al. (1997) 
Study on the 
processes of 
managing conflict 
in channels of 
distribution by 
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Opportunistic, reward, coercive, 
referent, expert and legitimate 
power sources 
Respondents agreed that the use of 
reward power enhances the use of 
referent, expert and legitimate power 
sources, while the use of coercive power 
detracts from the use of referent, expert 








prior work which 
has considered 
interfirm linkages 
only at a general 





























Potential versus exercised 
power, persuasive versus 
coercive power 
 
The case suggests how ED1 adoption 
and use can be an opportunity for 
developing trust. It provides evidence of 
trustful behaviour emerging particularly 
from the explorations carried on with 






Study on power 



























dichotomization of power 
 
This paper provides both instigation and 
insight for the academic and practitioner 
pursuit of power influences in the supply 
chain. Despite the value of this research 
in exposing power issues, it does not 
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through the use of 
three control 
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Power conceptualized through 
interdependence magnitude and 
asymmetry, number of 
alternatives available to the 
retailer, length of the 
relationship with the supplier, 
type of retailer.  
 
The results indicate that the retailer’s 
perceptions of supplier commitment are 
positively related to its evaluation of 
supplier performance and satisfaction 
and negatively related to conflict. 
Iglesias et 
al. (2000) 



































Power conceptualized as control 
over the economic issues 
(control over prices and control 
over deferred payments) and 
control over marketing issues 
(control over the distributor’s 
assortment, over the design of 
promotions, and over the 
wholesaler’s prices to 
customers). 
The results obtained in the empirical 
research showed the weak ability of 
these exclusivity agreements to provide 
an incentive for distributors to improve 






Study of the nature 
of 

































manager and  
Power conceptualized as 
influence strategies of 
(1) threats and (2) legalistic 
pleas, departmental power 
(refers to the relative importance 
of a department to an 
organization in general), 
manifest influence (actual effect 
in terms of changing the 
opinions and behaviours of other 
members). 
Overall, 17 out of the 20 hypotheses 
were found to be statistically significant. 
Consequently, very strong support is 
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Study on the effect 





retail chains and 
their vendors. 








chain and the 
vendor 
 
Power as a single construct  One major contribution of this study is to 
show that characteristics of one 
interorganizational system (the chain) 
have an impact on another 
interorganizational system (the chain-
vendor relation). This study has pointed 
out some important factors of effective 





Study on the 
buyer’s power 







Field study  Manufacturin




















Power as a single construct 
conceptualized as 
the ratio of supplier-dependence 
and buyer-dependence 
 
This research has addressed two specific 
aspects of business-to-business 
relationships economic dependence and 
relational ties and both seem to be 
significant antecedents of contractual 















































Power is classified as power of 
suppliers and power of IT 
 
Power of suppliers is not as significant as 
expected. Although e-procurement is a 
synchronous adoption of technology, 
none of the firms interviewed consider 
power of suppliers as an important factor 
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combinations of 
high/low trust and 
high/low formal 
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Formal control (private and legal 
ordering mechanisms 
(safeguards) to protect against 
opportunistic behaviour)  
 
Research shows that relationship 
between trust and formal contracts is a 
complex and dynamic one. Formal as 
well as non-contractual agreements can 
have different meanings in trusting 
atmospheres and in those where fear of 
opportunistic behaviour prevails.  
 
Kim et al. 
(2004) 







depending on their 
power in (or 
dependence 
on) the keiretsu 




















Power as a single construct  The results provide general support for 
the proposition that the keiretsu can be 
conceptualized as a power dependence 
system, hence the effects of keiretsu 
member affiliation differ across 
individual members according to their 




n et al. 
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Health Service 
and its Application 
to International 
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Power as a single construct  The analysis of power distribution in 
indicates that the power a chain member 
holds is directly related to whether the 
product concerned is a branded or a 
generic pharmaceutical. Apart from the 
therapeutic value of the pharmaceutical 
and the existence of substitutes, supply 
chain power also seems to be linked to 
the ownership and exploitation of 
resources. 
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Method of  
analysis 
Sample size  Level of 
analysis 





Study on the 
influences of 
supply chain power 
on supplier 
satisfaction. 




















Non-mediated power sources 
(expert and referent), coercive-
mediated power sources 
(coercive and legal legitimate), 
reward-mediated power 
These results show the importance of 
effective power management as an 
approach to enhance the integration of 
the supply chain. This leads to a critical 
awareness of supply chain power 
influences for both practitioners and 
researchers. 
























Power conceptualized as 
coercive/non-coercive influence 
strategies 
Results indicate that channel climate has 
a significant impact on channel 
solidarity; however, this impact may be 
mitigated by both channel power and the 
use of noncoercive influence strategies. 
Channel members with relatively more 
power appear able to determine the 
degree of channel solidarity through the 
use of effective noncoercive influence 
strategies. 
Hu et al. 
(2005) 






















dichotomization of power 
This study has built a conceptual 
framework among channel power, 
noncoercive influence strategies, channel 
climate, and solidarity, six corresponding 
hypotheses are postulated. The results 
imply that the mutual speculations 
between the target member and the 
source member still remain in the 
interest-induced power interaction 
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analysis 
Sample size  Level of 
analysis 


































Coercive influence strategies 
(threats, promises), noncoercive 
influence (rationality, 
recommendations, information 
exchange, and requests) 
In summary, this study makes several 
important contributions. 
The effectiveness of channels’ 
influence strategies in gaining 
compliance (their fundamental 





































dichotomization of power 
From the findings, the nonsignificant 
relationship between contingent use of 
coercive power on both economic and 
social satisfaction suggests that Chinese 
channel members behave differently 
from their Western counterparts in 




Study to explore 























suppliers and  
Power as a single construct  Getting SMEs to collaborate outside of a 
major contract allows SMEs to build 
mutual trust to the benefit of all. 
However, achieving this is an immensely 
difficult task. Whilst some will become 
involved in a formal partnership, such as 
a supply chain, most will not because 
they have no power in such a system 
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Field study        Manufacturin

























Power conceptualized as French 
and Raven’s five bases of social 
power. 
The study revealed that both Finnish and 
Swedish suppliers have most influence 
over in-store promotions and least 
influence over pricing. In the Finnish 
context, the extent of power is dependent 
on the market position of supplier. So-
called market leaders i.e. suppliers that 
have highest market share in the focal 
category have more control over CM 




Study of the 
working 
relationships 





Field study        U.S. export 
manufacturin

















s and foreign 
customers 
Coercive/non-coercive 
dichotomization of power 
One central conclusion which can be 
drawn from this study is that the nature 
of the power source exercised plays an 
instrumental role in fostering or 
weakening trust and commitment in 
international business relationships, 




Study to analyse 
the outcome that 
the use of Internet 
based electronic 



























and smaller  
companies 
Power as a single construct  The paper proposes a framework based 
on the combination of TCE and SET 
approaches to analyse inter-
organisational relationships and the 
outcome that the use of EM has on the 












Method of  
analysis 
Sample size  Level of 
analysis 
Operationalization of power  Results and implications 
Zhao et al. 
(2008) 
Study of the impact 



































Power sources according to 
French and Raven (1959), 
mediated/non-mediated 
dichotomization of power 
This study makes a contribution to the 
SCM and relationship management 
literature by systematically examining 
the influence of power on relationship 
commitment in a SC context. The results 
show that appropriate use of power can 




Study of the effects 
of trust and 





























Power is conceptualized as 
French and Raven’s coercive 
power source 
The findings suggest that using power 
and trust to manage relationships can 
improve supply chain integration. 
Managers should combine these two 







Appendix 3. Overview of the Empirical Studies on Power according to Reviewed Journals and Key Words 
Journal  Keywords  Study 
Working paper  Power  - Chatziaslan et.al. (2005) 
- Maloni and Benton (1999) 
- Dawes and Massey (2001) 
- Lindblom et.al. (2007) 
- Klein Woolthuis et al. (2002) 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management 
Power  - Dapiran et.al. (2003) 
Academy of Management Journal  Power  - Yan and Grey (1994) 
Journal of International Business Studies  Power  - Johnson et.al. (1993) 
Journal of Marketing  Power  - Mohr et.al. (1996) 
- Kohli (1989) 
- Keith et.al. (1990) 
- Venkatesh et.al. (1995) 
- Frazier and Rody (1991) 
The Journal of Risk and Insurance  Power  - Cather and Howe (1989) 
Journal of Marketing Research  Power  - Jap and Ganesan (2000) 
- Kale (1986) 
- Gaski (1986) 
- McAlister et.al. (1986) 
- Gaski and Nevin (1985) 
- Scheer and Stern (1992) 
European Journal of Marketing  Power  - Rokkan and Haugland (2000) 
Journal of Marketing Channels  Power  - Iglesias et.al (2000) 
Industrial Marketing Management  Power  - Leonidou et.al. (2007)  
- Hu and Sheu (2005) 
- Bunduchi (2007) 
Strategic Management Journal  Power  - Galbraith and Stiles (1983) 
- Kim et.al. (2004) 
Scandinavian Journal of Management  Power  - Buvik and Reve (2002) 
International Journal of Networking and 
Virtual Organisations 
Power  - Johnston et.al. (2006) 
Journal of Business Research  Power  - Rawwas et.al (1997) 
Journal of Retailing  Power  - Brown et.al. (1995) 
- Ramaseshan et.al. (2006) 
Organization Science  Power  - Hart and Saunders (1997) 
Proceedings  Power  - Chan and Lee (2002) 
International Journal of Production Economics  Power  - Yeung et.al. (2009) 
Journal of Operations Management  Power  - Zhao et.al (2008) 
- Benton and Maloni (2005) 
Working paper  Control  - Chatziaslan et.al. (2005) 
- Maloni and Benton (1999) 
- Lindblom et.al. (2007) 
- Klein Woolthuis et al. (2002) 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management 
Control  - Dapiran et.al. (2003) 
Academy of Management Journal  Control  - Yan and Grey (1994) 
Journal of International Business Studies  Control  - Johnson et.al. (1993) 
Journal of Marketing  Control  - Mohr et.al. (1996) 
- Kohli (1989) 
- Keith et.al. (1990) 




Journal  Keywords  Study 
Journal of Marketing Research  Control  - Jap and Ganesan (2000) 
- Kale (1986) 
- McAlister et.al. (1986) 
- Scheer and Stern (1992) 
Journal of Marketing Channels  Control  - Iglesias et.al (2000) 
Scandinavian Journal of Management  Control  - Buvik and Reve (2002) 
Organization Science  Control  - Hart and Saunders (1997) 
Strategic Management Journal  Control  - Kim et.al. (2004) 
Journal of Retailing  Control  - Ramaseshan et.al. (2006) 
International Journal of Production Economics  Control  - Yan Yeung et.al. (2009) 
Journal of Operations Management  Control  - Zhao et.al. (2008) 
- Benton and Maloni (2005) 
Industrial Marketing Management  Control  - Bunduchi (2007) 
Working paper  Dominance  - Chatziaslan et.al. (2005) 
- Lindblom et.al. (2007) 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management 
Influence  - Dapiran et.al. (2003) 
Academy of Management Journal  Influence  - Yan and Grey (1994) 
Journal of International Business Studies  Influence  - Johnson et.al. (1993) 
Journal of Marketing  Influence  - Mohr et.al. (1996) 
- Payan and McFarland (2005)           
- Kohli (1989) 
- Keith et.al. (1990) 
- Venkatesh et.al. (1995) 
- Frazier and Rody (1991) 
The Journal of Risk and Insurance  Influence  - Cather and Howe (1989) 
Journal of Marketing Research  Influence  - Kale (1986) 
- Gaski (1986) 
- Scheer and Stern (1992) 
Industrial Marketing Management  Influence  - Leonidou et.al. (2007)  
- Hu and Sheu (2005) 
- Bunduchi (2007) 
Strategic Management Journal  Influence  - Galbraith and Stiles (1983) 
- Kim et.al. (2004) 
Scandinavian Journal of Management  Influence  - Buvik and Reve (2002) 
Journal of Retailing  Influence  - Brown et.al. (1995) 
- Ramaseshan et.al (2006) 
Organization Science  Influence  - Hart and Saunders (1997) 
Working Paper  Influence  - Maloni andBenton (1999) 
- Dawes and Massey (2001) 
- Lindblom et.al. (2007) 
Proceedings  Influence  - Chan and Lee (2002) 
International Journal of Production Economics  Influence  - Yeung et.al. (2009) 
Journal of Operations Management  Influence  - Zhao et.al (2008) 
- Benton and Maloni (2005) 
 